methodologies used for this study, presents and discusses the results, and concludes with several questions for further study.
᭤ State-Mandated Local Planning in Coastal North Carolina
North Carolina's coastal region, as defined by the state's Coastal Area Management Act of 1974 (CAMA; NC Gen. Stat. 113A-100 et seq.), consists of the twenty coastal counties bordering the Atlantic Ocean and the Albemarle and Pamlico Sounds (see Figure 1 ). It encompasses about 320 miles of oceanfront beaches and 4,000 miles of estuarine shorelines (North Carolina Division of Coastal Management 1994 . The state enacted CAMA after two years of contentious debate largely in response to impending threats to the region's resources from ongoing development (see Heath 1974; U.S. Department of Commerce 1978; Owens 1985; Heath and Owens 1994) . The CAMA program consists of four parts: a regulatory permitting program for statutorily defined areas of environmental concern (AECs), a state-mandated local land use planning program, a state-to-local grantsin-aid program, and a coastal area land acquisition program. As of the mid-1990s, seventy-two municipalities and all twenty coastal counties were preparing CAMA land use plans.
The CAMA program was designed to strike a balance between the preservation of the coastal area's natural resource base and the orderly economic development of the coastal region (North Carolina Division of Coastal Management 1986). It does this primarily through the regulatory permitting program and the local planning program (supported by state grants and augmented by state land acquisition). The regulatory permitting authority applies only to the AECs, which consist of the coastal water bodies themselves, coastal shorelines, relatively narrow shoreline buffers, and coastal wetlands (Owens 1985; see 15A NC Admin. Code 7H.201 et seq. [2001] ). AECs are delineated on the ground in response to development permit requests and comprise altogether roughly 5 to 7 percent of the coastal region. In contrast, local land use planning under CAMA is mandated for the entire coastal region, including the AECs and beyond. The Coastal Resources Commission (CRC), which administers the act, prescribes the local planning process through administrative rules referred to as "planning guidelines" (see 15A NC Admin. Code 7B [2001] ).
The CAMA program represents a collaborative state-local partnership for regional growth management, one that could be characterized as a "conjoint" approach using Bollens's (1992) typology. In their multistate study of hazards mitigation, a group of researchers headed by Burby and May (1997, 11) characterize North Carolina's CAMA local planning mandate as both "moderately prescriptive" and "moderately persuasive." As of the mid-1990s, the state set overall management goals and prescribed general procedural requirements through its planning guidelines but left decisions on appropriate implementation and specific policy choices largely to the localities. Also, because of a political compromise reached during the state legislature's deliberations (Heath 1974, 376) , the act mandates that local planning address the state's goal of balancing environment and economy throughout the entire coastal region-including areas beyond the AECs (Heath 1974, 371-73; North Carolina Division of Coastal Management 1986; Longest and Smith 2000) , but it specifically prohibits the CRC from requiring that localities implement their plans outside of the AECs (NC Gen. Stat. 113A-111 [2001] ).
Since the early 1990s, there has been substantial and growing evidence that North Carolina's coastal resources are continuing to decline despite more than two decades of local CAMA planning. This is especially true with regard to coastal habitat loss, wetland loss, estuarine shellfish bed closings, and coastal water quality degradation more generally (North Carolina Coastal Futures Committee 1994; Mallin and Wheeler 2000; Mallin et al. , 2001 . This continued decline is attributable largely to cumulative impacts from ongoing development occurring throughout the coastal region (see North Carolina Division of Coastal Management 1994) . By the mid 1990s, the need to improve local planning in order to address these problems was emphasized by a state blue-ribbon commission (North Carolina Coastal Futures Committee 1994) , and environmental activists began pressing the state to demand more rigorous local plans and to compel local plan implementation. The program erupted in controversy in mid 1998 when the CRC temporarily refused to certify a local plan based on environmentalists' complaints. The CRC subsequently placed a moratorium on the local planning process and convened a stakeholder advisory group to revisit its administrative rules (see North Carolina Division of Coastal Management 2000). 1 That turn of events presented the opportunity to build upon recent scholarship on state-mandated local planning by conducting a focused study of local planning in coastal North Carolina.
᭤ Evaluating State-Mandated Local Planning Outcomes
A good way to start a program evaluation is to ask why the program was established in the first place. The history of the CAMA program and the state's planning mandate itself suggest that the intent underlying the program's genesis was to use state-mandated local planning as a means to improve local land use decision making, especially for the purpose of improving environmental protection. As explained by one of the act's original cosponsors, CAMA was designed from the start to be "99 percent planning and 1 percent regulation," and the hope was that having become better informed by the planning process, local officials would do a better job of protecting coastal resources in making their land policy decisions (Willis Whichard, retired state representative and state supreme court justice, telephone communication with the author, February 2001). This reflects a traditional approach to planning centered on promoting a larger public interest and improving the information base for public and private decision making (see Klosterman 1985) . It also suggests the usefulness of thinking about planning as a form of policy argumentation (Fischer and Forester 1993) .
Viewing local CAMA plans as comprehensive policy arguments for informing local land use decision making, the next question becomes how one evaluates local planning outcomes.
While planning scholars have focused much attention on debating the justifications for planning and improving the plan-making process, they have not given comparable attention to evaluating the quality of the plans produced or how well they are implemented (Talen 1996; Baer 1997) . Fischer and Forester (1993, 4-5) conceptualize planning as the process of crafting policy arguments that are "internally coherent and externally compelling," for example, but concentrate on evaluating "what planners do in everyday practice" and "how complex institutional factors shape the public's understanding of policy process and policy substance." Similarly, while systematic studies of state growth management programs more broadly have addressed questions like the politics of their genesis (e.g., DeGrove 1984), the various program designs they have employed (e.g., Gale 1992; Weitz 1999) , or the land development patterns they appear to have yielded (e.g., Carruthers 2002), they have not addressed as directly the quality of the local plans produced, the policies adopted through those plans, or the ways in which those plans actually inform the local decision-making process.
A more recent body of conceptual and empirical work on state-mandated local planning for growth management, particularly in the context of natural hazards mitigation, has substantially advanced both theoretical and methodological approaches to evaluating planning outcomes (see Burby et al. 1993; Berke and French 1994; Dalton and Burby 1994; Berke et al. 1996; Burby and May 1997, 1998; Deyle and Smith 1998) . Referred to collectively hereafter as the development management literature, it consistently points to several important and closely related factors in explaining planning outcomes: the use and structure of planning mandates, the administration of those mandates by state officials, local fiscal and administrative capacity to plan, and local commitment (i.e., both elected and administrative officials' commitment to both planning and growth management goals). The study presented here builds in part upon this development management literature, especially on the work presented in Burby and May (1997) but, in doing so, incorporates several conceptual modifications.
Focusing on Local Commitment and Context
The Burby and May research team (1997) focused on the role played by mandates, including both single-purpose (hazard mitigation) and comprehensive planning mandates. To do this, they used a multistate design to compare states employing different configurations of mandates and states without mandates. They sought primarily to evaluate whether state planning mandates yield better local planning outcomes with regard to hazard mitigation. Under the institutional setting created by North Carolina's CAMA program, all of the coastal localities undertaking CAMA planning face the same planning mandate. That mandate establishes goals uniformly across the region, combines both coercive and collaborative elements, is comprehensive in what it requires, includes sanctions for noncompliance, and is administered consistently across the region.
2 By studying state-mandated local planning within a single state, the research design I employed for this study controlled for the mandate-related policy variables that might explain variation in planning outcomes. Moreover, because the state provides grants and technical assistance to all of the localities when updating their plans, I expected variation in plan quality and plan implementation during the mid-1990s to be a function primarily of variation in local commitment to planning and locality-specific contextual variables.
Reconceptualizing Local Commitment and Its Relationship to Plan Quality
In addition to focusing on local commitment, I reconceptualized the concept of commitment itself in several respects. First, the Burby and May research team (1997, 169-70) conceptualized local commitment as commitment specifically to the substantive goal of "reducing the threat of losses from natural hazards." In doing so, they looked at commitment on the part of both local administrative officials (primarily planning directors) and local elected officials, focusing mostly on the administrative officials. For this study, I looked primarily at local elected officials' commitment and evaluated both their commitment to planning as a function of government and their commitment to the substantive policy goals of economic development and environmental protection. The analysis and findings presented here focus on the more procedural concept of commitment to planning; my analysis and findings related specifically to substantive policies are presented elsewhere (Norton 2005b) . Second, while Burby, May, and other researchers relied upon here have long recognized the importance of local commitment and have done much work to identify mechanisms to enhance it, they have not given comparable attention to what motivates commitment in the first place. Absent the imposition of sanctions or incentives by higher levels of government, it is not clear what factors or attributes of local officials themselves would tend to make them more or less committed to the process of planning or to substantive growth management goals. Given the central role of local commitment as conceptualized here, and given the limited attention to this question in the development management literature, I employed several conceptual perspectives for assessing local elected officials' commitment to planning, as explained in more detail below.
In addition to reconceptualizing commitment, I took a different perspective on its likely relationship to plan quality. One of Burby and May's (1997) key hypotheses was that mandates and higher-quality plans yield more commitment by local officials to address hazard mitigation, which in turn yields more effective development management programs. They reasoned that higher-quality plans make more compelling arguments and thus prompt the adoption of more effective implementation components. They concluded that while their findings were not inconsistent with this hypothesis, the evidence did not provide strong support for it either and that causality might in fact move in the other direction (pp. 142-44) . Because the practice of preparing five-year CAMA plan updates had become well established if not routine by the mid-1990s (Heath and Owens 1994) , I hypothesized that causality was in fact moving in the other direction, with higher levels of local elected officials' commitment leading to higher quality plans (because more committed officials would take the plan-making process more seriously and produce better plans) and then ultimately to increased plan implementation.
Reconceptualizing Plan Implementation
Finally, I also designed this study to focus on the mechanism linking commitment, the local plan, and plan implementation. All of the development management analyses summarized above address the relationships between state-level concerns or mandates, on one hand, and local planning and development management efforts, on the other. Burby and May (1997, 166-68) conceptualized plan implementation, for example, in terms of the content and character of a locality's development management program, measured according to the numbers and different types of development management tools a locality might have adopted. This approach generally presumes that the mechanism actually linking state mandates, local planning efforts, and observed outcomes is the local government's use of its own plan. The questions of how much and in what ways local officials actually use their plans when making land use-related public policy decisions, however, while addressed by scholars in different settings (e.g., Flyvbjerg 1998), has not been addressed as directly in the development management literature.
For the purposes of this study, I defined local plan implementation as plan use, or the extent to which the plan played a role in guiding the efforts of local elected officials (municipal councils or county commissions) when engaged in land use policy decision making (primarily when adopting or substantially revising land use regulations-the principal means by which local elected officials, as opposed to administrative officials, use the local plan). I focused on local elected officials rather than planning agency officials because the elected officials collectively set the tone for land use planning and decision making and make the locality's overarching land use policies through their ordinances and infrastructure decisions.
᭤ Conceptual Frameworks
Explaining Variation in Local Commitment and Planning Outcomes I employed two distinct conceptual frameworks for evaluating planning efforts and outcomes in coastal North Carolina. The first, designed to explain observed variation in those efforts and outcomes, builds upon a modified development management framework. This conceptual model centers on three principal concepts: local elected officials' commitment to CAMA planning, the quality and content of local land use plans produced under CAMA, and the use of those plans. Table 1 presents the constructs, data sources, and observed values for these three variables. The appendix presents the protocols I used to operationalize them.
A more comprehensive explication of the theoretical justifications for these variables, as well as more detailed discussion of findings regarding observed outcomes taken as a whole, have been presented elsewhere (Norton 2005a (Norton , 2005b . Briefly, I found that local elected officials in coastal North Carolina as of the mid-1990s were by and large committed to CAMA land use planning, that the localities were producing "good" plans in a number of respects, and that elected officials were using their plans when making land use-related policy decisions in a number of ways. Taken as a whole, however, the plans were weak analytically, employing limited land suitability analyses and establishing land development policies and future land use classifications with little apparent reference to natural resource constraints (i.e., beyond classifying state-designated AECs as conservation areas). At the same time, the coastal localities-through their plans-were relying almost uniformly on the state's minimum environmental protection standards to address the cumulative and secondary impacts resulting from land development occurring throughout the coastal region. In doing so, they left largely unaddressed development taking place outside of designated AECs that could substantially degrade those AECs (i.e., development occurring throughout more than 90 percent of the coastal region).
Beyond these general findings, I also found considerable variation in local commitment, plan quality, and plan use. In an attempt to explain the sources of that variation, I specified the conceptual model illustrated by Figure 2 . Operational constructs and data sources for the explanatory variables are presented in Table 2 . I specified the hypothesized relationship between the three dependent variables as sequential and cumulative, expecting higher commitment to lead to higher plan quality, and both higher commitment and higher plan quality to lead to increased plan use. I controlled for other potential mandate-related policy variables through the research design. The key variables hypothesized to explain plan quality and plan use, therefore, include local elected officials' commitment, local capacity to plan, and local contextual factors.
I am interested in understanding what role local land use planning actually plays in informing local decision making, especially in terms of how local elected officials use their plans when making land use policy and regulatory decisions and what considerations influence them in doing so. One of my fundamental goals in conducting this study, therefore, was to explore the potential sources of local elected officials' commitment to planning collectively and its influence on planning outcomes. As noted, researchers contributing to the development management literature have addressed commitment from a variety of perspectives but have not explicitly posited underlying sources of motivation for local officials. As an initial foray into assessing local elected officials' commitment, both conceptually and methodologically, I drew from several perspectives to hypothesize potential sources of motivation.
The tenor of the work comprising the development management literature suggests that the researchers contributing to that literature generally take a progressive view of planning and governance. Recognizing the importance of structured incentives and disincentives for influencing motivations, they nonetheless appear to expect that increased knowledge about the need for hazard mitigation and the role that planning can play in improving development management will lead local officials to want to implement their local plans-especially for the purpose of promoting a larger public interest in mitigated natural hazards. Starting from this perspective and drawing from the social psychology literature on commitment to personal relationships (Johnson 1991; Rusbult, Martz, and Agnew 1998) , 3 I hypothesized that local elected officials' commitment to planning might increase: as they collectively become more familiar with the process of planning, when they derive some satisfaction from administering or advancing the program (e.g., through their sense that they are promoting the public interest by doing so), when they believe they have made a large investment of some sort in the program (e.g., through publicly stated support for the plan), or when they feel some sense of duty to continue supporting the program. Conversely, local elected officials might be less committed to planning and plan implementation to the extent they prefer to make land use policy decisions on a case-specific basis or fear that following the plan would somehow limit their discretion to act in the future. I also turned to representative government and the political economy tradition in planning to identify several additional potential sources of commitment. I hypothesized that local elected officials may be more committed to planning to the extent they believe their constituents generally support planning. Alternatively, I hypothesized that they might be less committed to planning or motivated to follow through on their plans to the extent they are concerned that engaging in planning and plan implementation might somehow limit or constrain their locality's tax base, concerned about the controversy that might arise from litigation prompted by use of the plan (i.e., to the extent that plan policies often constrain unfettered land development), or-ultimately-concerned that engaging in planning might somehow diminish their chances of being reelected.
In addition to these more "internal" sources of motivation, I evaluated several external and several ideological factors that might influence local elected officials' commitment. First, drawing from the development management literature, I explored the importance of political activism as a source of commitment, focusing on the level of citizen engagement within the community more generally and more specifically on the presence in the community of vocal economic development advocates, vocal environmental protection advocates, and vocal slow-growth advocates. I also explored the importance of institutional support in the form of heightened commitment to CAMA planning by administrative staff, expecting to find that more committed staff would tend to yield more committed elected officials. Second, recognizing long-standing debates on what the purpose of planning should be from an ideological perspective (see, e.g., Talen 1996; Baer 1997), I expected that local elected officials who collectively see the purpose of planning and plans as something more like "guidelines" for development, rather than merely reference documents or vision statements, would be more committed to developing higher-quality plans and using them. Similarly, I expected that local elected officials who collectively believe that government should take a more proactive rather than limited role in advancing community interests, or that community interests should generally outweigh private property concerns, would also be more committed to planning.
The local context factors expected to play some role in explaining outcomes generally parallel situational factors identified in the development management literature (see, e.g., Dalton and Burby 1994; Burby and May 1997) . These include the proportion of the jurisdiction encompassing Note: See Norton (2005a) for a more comprehensive discussion of the theoretical justifications and observed findings for these variables. See the appendix for a more detailed description of their operational constructs.
sensitive environmental resources (where higher proportions of sensitive areas were expected to have a paradoxical effect of suppressing commitment and planning outcomes by reducing the availability of nonsensitive areas for development), development pressure within designated areas of environmental concern (where heightened pressure within those highly sensitive areas were expected to alert local officials to resource threats and lead to improved planning outcomes), and selected demographic variables (per capita income, population growth, growth in housing development). In addition, I controlled for jurisdiction type by identifying each locality as a county, a beach community, or an inland community. I did so because counties and municipalities, while both "local" relative to the state, are still different in their organization and scale, and because beach communities and inland communities, while both municipalities, nonetheless face different kinds of resource settings and development pressures.
Finally, specifically with regard to plan quality and plan use, I hypothesized that higher levels of commitment to planning by local elected officials would yield both higher-quality plans and greater use of those plans. Because higher-quality plans should arguably provide coherent and compelling arguments for informing land use decision making, I also hypothesized that plan quality by itself-independent of elected officials' commitment to planning-would tend to yield increased use of the plan for land use-related decision making. Finally, I distinguished between financial capacity (community wealth) and administrative capacity (professional planning staff). I expected that higher levels of administrative capacity would tend to yield higher-quality plans, by providing readily available expertise, and to increase plan use to the extent that the planning staff would likely emphasize the importance of the adopted plan (see Berke et al. 1996 Berke et al. , 1999 Burby and May 1997) . While anticipating that state planning grants equalized To the extent local elected officials were more committed to CAMA planning and plan use, a source of that motivation was the boards' sense that planning and plan use would serve the interests of the community best. (L ML MH H)
Positive effect on commitment Sense of investment To the extent local elected officials were more committed to CAMA planning and plan use, a source of that motivation was the boards' sense of need to follow through on publicly stated support for the plan.
(L ML MH H)
Positive effect on commitment
Sense of duty To the extent local elected officials were more committed to CAMA planning and plan use, a source of that motivation was a sense of duty because a plan is duly prepared and adopted by the community. (L ML MH H)
Positive effect on commitment
Preference for case-specific decision making
To the extent local elected officials were less committed to CAMA planning and plan use, a reason was the boards' fear of limiting its discretion to act in the future, or a preference to act on individual requests on a case-by-case basis. (Combined scores from two separate questions, each question scored L ML MH H)
Negative effect on commitment
Responsiveness to constituents
To the extent local officials were more committed to CAMA planning and plan use, a source of that motivation was their belief that engaging in planning was responsive to constituent wishes. (L ML MH H)
Positive effect on commitment
Tax base concerns To the extent local officials were less committed to CAMA planning and plan use, an important motivation was their concern that following the plan might limit or constrain the community's tax base. (L ML MH H)
Negative effect on commitment
Litigation concerns To the extent that local officials were less committed to CAMA planning and plan use, an important motivation was their concern that following the plan / might prompt litigation. (L ML MH H)
Reelection concerns To the extent local officials were less committed to CAMA planning and plan use, an important motivation was their concern that following the plan might diminish their reelection chances. ( local financial capacity somewhat, I expected that higher financial capacity might yield higher-quality plans but would not significantly influence plan use.
Explaining State-Mandated Local CAMA Planning as a Policy Subsystem
Upon conducting some initial exploratory work for this study, it became apparent that a second analytical framework-the advocacy coalition framework-might also provide a fruitful way for understanding local planning efforts and outcomes in coastal North Carolina. The advocacy coalition framework was developed and has been extended by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993, 1999) as an alternative to the more conventional "textbook" or "stages heuristic" approach to understanding public policy systems. It diverges from more conventional implementation evaluation approaches by viewing policy making and implementation as a seamless rather than a staged process. It also focuses on identifiable but unorganized belief-based associations of policy elites (i.e., united by fundamental normative values, instrumental policy beliefs, and causal assumptions) rather than on institutionally defined associations. Although not as widely applied or extensively developed in planning literatures as the development management framework, it has been used by Godschalk (1992) , for example, to assess efforts to implement the federal Costal Zone Management Act and by Birkland (1997) to assess catastrophic events in an agenda setting context.
In developing and extending their conceptual framework, Sabatier, Jenkins-Smith, and associated researchers conducted several case studies of systems comparable to North Carolina's
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Sources of commitment-Elected officials' ideological beliefs
Strong purpose of planning
The local elected board collectively viewed the purpose of planning as establishing a vision statement for the community alone (0) or a set of guidelines to direct land use decision making (1).
Positive effect on commitment
Proactive role for government
The local elected board collectively believed that local government should be more limited (0) or active (1) in serving community interests.
Community interests over private property
The local elected board collectively was more concerned about private property rights (0) or promoting community interests (1). (Munro 1993 ) and a study of efforts to manage land use in the Lake Tahoe Basin (Sabatier and Brasher 1993) . Drawing from the advocacy coalition framework and these cases in particular, I expected to be able to identify two distinct advocacy coalitions within coastal North Carolina, including some type of a "development" coalition and an "environmental" coalition. I anticipated that the development coalition would be focused primarily on the goal of promoting ongoing economic growth and development, while the environmental coalition would be striving for increased attention to the protection of coastal natural resources. I anticipated that each coalition's constituent members would be "policy elites" drawn from various levels of government, public interest groups, and interested private citizens and that while those members would not be formally aligned with one another, they would demonstrate some nontrivial level of coordinated effort toward their common policy goals. Finally, I anticipated that while two distinct coalitions would be identifiable and influential, the development coalition would be the dominant coalition in terms of shaping the ongoing implementation of the local CAMA planning program.
᭤ Method
Data Collection and Analysis I employed two complementary data collection and analysis approaches for this study, corresponding to the two conceptual frameworks just described. First, I evaluated systematically a cross-sectional sample of thirty-six coastal counties and municipalities, including eleven counties, fifteen estuarine and inland communities, and ten oceanfront or "beach" communities (referred to collectively as localities). Using a study period of 1993 through 1998 (i.e., long enough to capture potential use of the plan but prior to the eruption of controversy), I collected data through in-depth telephone surveys of local administrators and planning directors, 4 systematic content analyses of the local CAMA land use plans of record during the study period for 40 localities, 5 and short mail surveys of the state's district planners and attorneys representing coastal localities. I also collected demographic data from a variety of sources. Consistent with the approach employed by Burby, May, and their colleagues on planning for hazard mitigation, I used telephone and mail surveys to measure the local commitment and local plan implementation (plan use) variables (see Dalton and Burby 1994; Burby and May 1997) . To obtain information on these variables efficiently, I asked a single local administrator from each locality, acting as an informed observer, to characterize his or her local elected officials collectively (i.e., the city council or county commission) using an eighty-four-item telephone survey. In addition, I used shorter mail surveys of local attorneys and state planners to triangulate data sources for increased validity (see the appendix).
I evaluated local plan content and quality using a plan content evaluation protocol. I developed this protocol by first distilling evaluation criteria from recent work on plan evaluation generally (Baer 1997; Talen 1996) and from the development management literature cited above (see Burby and May 1997) . I then synthesized these general criteria with the specific requirements of North Carolina's CAMA planning mandate as of the mid-1990s, yielding a four-hundred-plus-item evaluation protocol. Consistent with the Burby and May work (see, e.g., Dalton and Burby 1994) , I scored plans for the presence and strength of specified items and constructed indices to yield overall measures of plan quality (see the appendix).
I used ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis to evaluate observed variation in planning efforts and outcomes and test the conceptual framework derived from the development literature (see Gujarati 1995) . As discussed more below, I ran separate regressions corresponding to the three dependent variables of the larger conceptual model-local elected officials' commitment to planning, plan quality, and plan use-each of which was operationalized as a continuous variable and proved to be well behaved in its distribution.
Concurrent with the cross-sectional analysis, I also conducted a qualitative assessment both to complement the quantitative analysis and to test the hypotheses posited using the advocacy coalition framework. For this approach, I attended twenty of the twenty-four full-day meetings conducted by the Land Use Planning Review Team (LUPRT) over an eighteenmonth period spanning from early 1999 into 2001. The LUPRT was the stakeholder group convened by the CRC to revisit its administrative rules for local CAMA planning in response to the eruption of controversy surrounding the program. It consisted of representatives from the state, local governments, and coastal environmental interest groups, along with a planning consultant and a planning academic. I also attended two-day CRC meetings held periodically at various locations throughout the coastal region during the same period, as well as several conferences convened by different coastal environmental groups focused on local CAMA planning. Attending these various meetings, I conversed informally with LUPRT members and other interested individuals from throughout the coastal region on a regular basis. Finally, I reviewed a variety of reports, newsletters, memoranda, and other documentary data produced by the state and various other sources.
Through these observations and conversations, along with open-ended questions asked during the telephone survey of administrators, I looked for strongly and consistently asserted explanations for how and why localities approached planning under CAMA as they did. I also played a devil's advocate role, asking local officials, for example, to respond to critiques or explanations I had heard from environmental activists. In conducting this qualitative assessment, I employed methods prescribed by Miles and Huberman (1994) and Marshall and Rossman (1995) , working especially to ensure that my findings were credible, transferable, reliable, and objective (see Marshall and Rossman 1995, 143-44) .
Analytical Limitations
Several analytical limitations, particularly with regard to the cross-sectional analysis of variation in planning efforts and outcomes, warrant brief discussion. First, I relied heavily on local officials to assess local characteristics and planning outcomes to collect data efficiently, raising the possibility of selfassessment bias. To address this potential problem, I used the responses from three separate sources-local administrators, local attorneys, and state planners-to test the reliability of the key variables requiring self-assessment and to construct the measure for plan use (see the appendix). Moreover, despite the potential for overstating commitment to planning or plan use, local administrators proved to be quite candid in their assessments; about half admitted that the CAMA plan was used little if at all. While there may have been some variation from biased self-reporting, it did not appear to be systematic or substantial.
A second analytical limitation relates to the direction of causality between local commitment to planning and plan quality and my use of a cross-sectional assessment to test my hypothesis that greater commitment yields higher quality plans (rather than higher quality plans yielding greater commitment). CAMA plans are updated routinely across the region every five years on a staggered basis. About two-thirds of the plans evaluated had been adopted prior to the five-year period of this study, while about one-third had been adopted during the study period. It could have been that turnover in elected officials led to one council adopting a plan and a second council having to implement it. Also, localities with recently adopted plans would not have had much time to actually implement their policies. To address these issues, I asked respondents early in the telephone survey whether the local council had changed substantially in membership during the study period and, if so, whether that change had led officials to address CAMA planning in a noticeably different way. Thirty of the thirty-six local councils had changed, usually by one or several members, but respondents indicated that that change had no apparent effect on local elected officials' approach to or their use of the CAMA plans except for three cases. In those three cases, I asked respondents to limit their assessments to the most recent council.
Other observations related to this causality issue as well. Several state and local officials, for example, noted that CAMA plans tended to include "flowery" rhetorical language about protecting the environment that would very likely disappear if the state decided to mandate plan implementation because local officials would not want to be held to those statements. Similarly, during the course of the telephone interviews, several administrators commented with regard to their use of a of consultant for their plan making that, in the words of one, "they knew what they wanted out of the plan and they knew which consultant would give it to them, so that's who they used." These observations suggested that local elected officials were paying close attention to what their plans said and how those plans might affect their subsequent land use decision making; that is, commitment to planning and planning goals appeared to be driving plan content and quality outcomes. Given the apparent stability in the makeup of local councils and their collective approach to CAMA planning during the study period, it was reasonable to posit that local elected officials' commitment to planning was an influential factor determining plan quality rather than vice versa. Nonetheless, because I was not able to test this hypothesis more rigorously through a longitudinal analysis, I qualify my findings and discussion with regard to the direction of causality between local commitment and plan quality.
A final analytical limitation relates to the small sample size of thirty-six observations. Ideally, given the number of variables involved and the relationships specified between them, I would have performed a single analysis to control for all of the variables simultaneously, employing path regression techniques to help separate out direct from indirect causal relationships. Such a small sample is barely large enough to conduct regression analysis given the relatively small degrees of freedom it provides, however, particularly when conducting analyses that require the use of a large number of parameters (see Tabachnick and Fidell 2001) .
This predicament is consistent with program evaluation studies generally, which typically suffer from the problem of "too many variables/too few obser vations" or overdetermination (Goggin 1986 ). Several prescriptions commonly offered for addressing this problem include increasing the number of observations, eliminating variables and retaining only those deemed to be most important conceptually, using matched cases for comparison, or combining both smalland large-N studies into a single research effort to test a wellestablished conceptual framework. One step taken here was to use both quantitative and qualitative analytical methods and test well-established conceptual frameworks.
I employed a second, more practical approach as well. I specified and tested one regression model for each of the three dependent variables separately. I then assessed the results from those separate analyses taken altogether to present overall outcomes in a manner consistent with the overall conceptual framework. Nonetheless, even after breaking the full model apart, the number of observations available was sufficient to allow separate models with only a very limited number of independent variables. Recognizing that limitation, I fully specified each model and then dropped sequentially variables that appeared to be neither significant nor serving an important control function (i.e., did not substantially affect the coefficients or significance levels of the other variables). In other words, I performed a form of "sequential regression" (see Tabachnick and Fidell 2001, 131-33) , except that I specified the sequential models manually, paying close attention to the conceptual framework, rather than relying on an automatic modeling routine. Potential explanatory variables that were dropped altogether included several hypothesized sources of local commitment and local financial capacity. In addition, I dropped variables from a given model that appeared to be not important for that model even though it was important for one or both of the other models (e.g., dropping change in population from the commitment model but retaining it for the other two).
᭤ Findings

Regression Analyses
The results of the OLS regression analyses on the three key dependent variables are presented in Table 3 and shown schematically in Figure 3 . The coefficients from the regression analyses are not shown on Figure 3 to avoid giving the impression that the results come from a single path regression analysis. Recognizing the limitation of comparing standardized variables across different dependent variables with different standard errors (i.e., it may be easier to influence one variable more than the others), the arrows indicating direction of causality and effect are weighted to approximate standardized coefficients to give some sense of the apparent relative importance of the various independent variables.
All of the final models specified are six-to ten-variable models, all are statistically significant, and all have R 2 values of .64 or better. That is, the results from all three models appear to be robust and to account for a substantial amount of the observed variation in planning outcomes. Given the very small sample size available for this study, the analyses presented here should not be taken as providing definitive explanations of causality. Nonetheless, one of the attributes of regression analyses conducted on small samples is that factors that are statistically significant can be taken as clearly significant while factors that are marginally significant cannot be clearly dismissed for having no significant effect (see Allison 1999) . While the statistical power available was limited, therefore, the analytical results presented here at the very least suggest that many of the factors retained in the final model specifications were having measurable influences on the dependent variables and as such provide a reasonable foundation for additional theoretical and empirical study.
Local Elected Officials' Commitment to Planning
Findings from the combined regression analyses are consistent in a number of ways, albeit not uniformly, with the hypothesized model. As expected, several internal sources of commitment derived from the development management literature appear to have been important factors enhancing commitment, including local elected officials' sense of serving community interests and sense of duty as sources of motivation for engaging in planning and using the CAMA plan. Also as expected, local elected officials' commitment was moderately diminished when they collectively preferred to make decisions on a case-specific basis and not limit their discretion to do so in the future. In contrast, internal sources of commitment that I expected to be important but apparently were not included elected officials' familiarity with the planning process and sense of investment in that process by virtue of publicly stated support. Because local planning in coastal North Carolina has been routine for more than two decades, and to the extent that elected officials typically play a less direct role in the plan-making process than do planning commissioners and administrative staff, these findings are not overly surprising.
Of the other hypothesized internal sources of commitment, reelection concerns related to planning and plan use appeared to significantly diminish local elected officials' commitment to planning as expected. In contrast, neither concerns about limiting the locality's tax base nor a sense of being responsive to constituent demands had a significant effect on commitment to planning either way. Concerns about prompting litigation did appear to affect local elected officials' commitment, although not in the way anticipated. I expected that a fear of prompting litigation from engaging in planning or following the plan would tend to make local elected officials' less committed to planning. While concerns about litigation appeared to be substantially influential, however, they tended to make local elected officials more committed to planning rather than less. Perhaps officials viewed planning as a way to make their land use-related policy making more defensible legally. This attitude would be consistent with land use case law in North Carolina, which has established the importance of consistency between the plan and the zoning code for defending local land use regulations (see Owens 1999) . Unfortunately, I did not probe this issue further for this study.
In addition to these various internal sources of commitment, local political activism and institutional support appear to have been influential as well, but not uniformly. The presence of vocal economic development advocates in the community apparently increased local elected officials' commitment to planning but had no significant effect on either plan quality or plan use. At the same time, the presence of vocal environmental protection advocates tended to increase the overall 162 Norton quality of the plans being produced but had no effect on commitment or plan use. Citizen engagement generally appears to have been an important factor tending to increase plan use but had no significant effect on either commitment or plan quality. The presence of vocal slow-growth advocates had no significant effect on any of the dependent variables. Administrative staff commitment tended to increase plan quality but had no discernable effect on elected officials' commitment to planning or their use of the plan. Finally and somewhat surprisingly, none of the ideological factors examined-local elected officials' view of the purpose of planning, the role of government, or the proper balance between community and private property-appeared to significantly influence their commitment to planning. All of these findings are discussed again in light of the qualitative findings presented below.
Local Capacity to Plan
I expected that local financial capacity might have a positive effect on plan quality and that local administrative capacity would yield both higher quality plans and increased plan use. I found that while administrative capacity did have a moderately positive influence on plan quality, it did not appear to influence plan use. Moreover, financial capacity had no apparent influence on plan quality. The lack of effect from financial capacity in particular was probably due to the fact that all of the plans evaluated for this study were funded largely through state grants. According to records provided by state officials, the state provided on average about $15,000 to each locality undertaking CAMA land use plan updates during the mid 1990s. State officials also indicated that this was the sole source of planning funds for many of the coastal communities. While not substantial, this funding support may have truncated the effect of financial capacity somewhat, elevating the quality of plans from localities with lower levels of financial capacity than what might have occurred absent state support.
Local Context
With regard to context variables, increased environmental sensitivity (i.e., the approximate proportion of the jurisdiction encompassing wetlands and other sensitive resources) was specified as a measure of the reduced feasibility of crafting effective development management solutions and was expected to dampen local elected officials' commitment to planning. Controlling for jurisdiction type, however, the observed findings were in fact the opposite. At the same time, increased development pressure within AECs was specified as a measure of the seriousness of the development management problem within the most sensitive areas and was expected to heighten commitment, but this also was opposite of what was observed. Increased development pressure did tend to increase plan quality, however, as was anticipated. With regard to jurisdiction type, the findings suggest that although local officials of both beach and inland communities were more committed to planning than were county officials, municipalities also tended to produce lower-quality plans relative to the counties. At the same time, elected officials from inland communities appeared to use their plans less to guide their land use-related decision making than did county officials (plan use for beach communities was not significantly different from counties).
The relationships between these context variables and the other explanatory variables are not easily interpreted. To some extent, the finding that municipalities appeared to be more committed to planning but producing relatively lower-quality plans may have been a function primarily of the plan evaluation criteria used and the difference in scale between county and municipality. The counties had more room to work with in their planning efforts and thus more ability to work within constraints imposed by the landscape. Perhaps more important, counties did not have to plan for areas encompassed by incorporated municipalities, many of which-including primarily the beach communities-were located within and had to plan for substantial areas of sensitive environmental resources. Beyond these observations, it is not clear based on the regression analyses alone whether the relationships as observed here differ from expectations derived from the development management literature-to the extent they do-because of real differences in causal relationships, or because of my modifications to the conceptual framework or because of differences in the measurement constructs employed for the independent variables.
Local Commitment, Plan Quality, and Plan Use
A central hypothesis I set out to test was the expectation that higher levels of commitment to planning on the part of local elected officials would tend to yield higher-quality plans (i.e., plans that present more compelling arguments for guiding local land use-related decision making) and that both higher commitment and better plans would each tend to yield increased use of the plan for decision-making purposes. Analysis of observed variation in planning outcomes confirmed the significant and substantial importance of local elected officials' commitment to planning as a positive influence on plan quality, although I was unable to rigorously test the direction of causality given the limitations of the research designed employed for this study as described above. Local elected officials' commitment appears to have had a significant if more moderate influence on plan use as well.
Altogether, the key determinants of plan quality appear to have been local elected officials' commitment to planning, political activism by environmental activists, staff commitment, administrative capacity, and several contextual factors, all of which (except for jurisdiction type as discussed above) tended to have a positive effect. Confirming the importance of local commitment and capacity for yielding higher-quality plans is a significant finding of this research but not unexpected. Upon some reflection, the influence of environmental activism on plan quality in coastal North Carolina is not surprising either. Almost by definition, all of the localities in the coastal region face pressing land use-related coastal resource protection issues. Because the plan content evaluation protocol used for this study placed some emphasis on the quality and use of land suitability analysis for supporting the plan's land use policies, it may have been that the presence of environmental activists in a community focused more attention on environmental issues during the plan making process, yielding plans that addressed coastal resource constraints more thoroughly and thus scored higher in terms of overall plan quality.
Somewhat surprising was the limited number of factors that appeared to influence plan use. The only statistically significant factor that appeared to substantially diminish the role played by the plan was jurisdiction type, where inland communities appeared to be much less likely to use their plans relative to counties and beach communities. Taken as a group, the beach communities were the only jurisdictions in North Carolina's coastal region gaining substantially in population in the mid-1990s while the inland communities were losing population and the counties were not changing significantly. In addition, development pressure within AECs was moderately high within beach communities, somewhat lower within the counties, and not significant in the inland communities. It may have been that the diminished importance of the plan for decision making in inland communities was a function primarily of the lower frequency and more limited nature of the decisions that were made in those communities. I was not able to explore this question further, however, because the measurement construct I used to operationalize plan use did not incorporate a measure of frequency of use and because I was unable to test interaction terms (e.g., with population change) or conduct more sophisticated statistical analyses given the limited statistical power provided by the small sample size.
Perhaps the most surprising finding from this analysis is that plan quality apparently did not significantly influence local elected officials' use of their plans in coastal North Carolina. While it may have been the case that higher-quality plans yielded "better" land policy decisions-an outcome not directly measured for this study-it appears that having a higher-quality plan by itself did not necessarily increase the importance of or the role played by the plan for informing local elected officials' land use-related decision making. Thus, the only factors that appeared to significantly enhance the role played the plan was elected officials' own commitment to planning generally and, more important, citizen engagement in the community. The substantial influence of citizen engagement makes sense in that engaged citizens are, by definition, paying closer attention to what local officials are doing and why. Perhaps that heightened level of attention prompted elected officials to justify their decisions more carefully and thus rely more explicitly on their local plan to do so.
Qualitative Analysis
Using an advocacy coalition framework, I analyzed the local CAMA planning program as a single case. I approached the planning program as a policy subsystem nested within the larger CAMA program, nested in turn within larger overlapping systems of state and local government relationships and state environmental protection laws and programs. As expected, I was able to distinguish and characterize two competing advocacy coalitions. One fit the characteristics of an environmental coalition as characterized by other researchers using the advocacy coalition framework in other settings. Rather than finding a development coalition in opposition to the environmentalists, however, I concluded that a more appropriate characterization of the competing coalition was as a "localist" coalition.
Through the telephone surveys of local administrators and plan content evaluations, I found substantial evidence that local officials and local CAMA plans tended to emphasize economic development over environmental protection, when a clear policy preference or emphasis could be discerned (see Norton 2005a Norton , 2005b . Even so, it became clear through the debates about how to revise the state's planning mandate that the issue of where to strike the balance between environment and economy was not the fundamental source of conflict. Rather, there were two fundamental debates occurring simultaneously-inseparable yet distinct. Overlying the debate over where the proper balance between environment and economy should be struck was a vehement debate about who gets to decide. It was a debate at its core about the proper locus of land use governance. While there was some variation at the local level over the substance of the environment/economy debate, there was virtual unanimity among local officials-and many state officials-that local government ought to have the final say in deciding local planning and land use policy issues.
The two coalitions shaping the ongoing implementation of the local CAMA planning program thus corresponded to these two fundamental policy debates. Members of each coalition participated in each of the two debates but were motivated in their concerns and perceptions primarily by one or the other. Members of the localist coalition-mostly local officials and some state officials-were concerned first and foremost with maintaining the autonomy of local government. They recognized the concerns of environmentalists (and some were apparently more interested in protecting the environment than promoting economic development), but as a group the environment/economy debate was secondary to their concern about safeguarding local policy-making discretion. Conversely, members of the environmentalist coalition-mostly environmental activists, some state officials, and some local officials-were motivated first and foremost by their concerns regarding the coastal region's continuing ecological decline. For them, the secondary issue was not who should decide policy as a question of governance but which level of government was most likely to do a better job of protecting the environment. Table 4 presents a summary of the defining characteristics of these competing advocacy coalitions. Beyond these characteristics, the most striking aspect of their deliberations was the distrust between them, a distrust that often revealed itself through misattributions of opponents' underlying motivations. A number of localists, for example, spoke angrily of environmentalists "playing dirty," being "dictatorial," and doing an "end run" around local government by going to the state and demanding more stringent oversight of local policy making. They saw these efforts as an illegitimate attempt by environmentalists to manufacture trouble to bring more attention and power to themselves. They viewed the environmentalists' complaints and tactics as motivated more by a desire for political power than a real concern for the environment.
For their part, several environmentalists spoke with equal anger about their dealings with localists, viewing them as coopted, if not corrupted, by developers and landowners composing a proverbial "good-old-boy" network. They averred that local officials' protestations about their commitment to CAMA planning and environmental protection was nothing more than a disingenuous attempt to hide a true lack of effort behind a façade of environmental rhetoric. They viewed localists' complaints and tactics as motivated more by a desire to promote their own economic and political well-being (at the expense of the coastal environment) than a real concern for good government.
Finally, review of historical accounts and observation of efforts to revise the state's planning mandate suggest that the environmentalist coalition has played a profound role over time in shaping the local CAMA planning program. It was a fundamental motivator of CAMA's inception and more recently a fundamental instigator of reform. Nonetheless, the localist coalition has played the dominant role. Localists managed to limit state oversight of local land use policy making through CAMA's enactment and throughout its long-term implementation into the mid-1990s. They have done this primarily by keeping the AECs narrowly defined and by ensuring that discretion over land use-related policy decisions made through local plans would be left largely to the localities themselves, especially for areas outside of delineated AECs.
᭤ Discussion
I undertook this study of state-mandated local planning in coastal North Carolina because I was intrigued by the controversy that had erupted over its implementation. I started by building on the work of Burby and May (1997) and their colleagues to develop a conceptual framework for characterizing and explaining local efforts and outcomes in the coastal region. In doing so, I focused especially on local elected officials' commitment to planning and on the role that planning played in informing their land use-related decision making. After some initial research, I also incorporated a second conceptual framework-an advocacy coalition framework-to complement my assessment. Having presented my findings, it works best to think about local planning in coastal North Carolina first from a larger perspective using the advocacy coalition framework and then contemplate the sources of variation in observed local planning efforts and outcomes across the region within that context. Taken altogether, local CAMA planning and plan implementation efforts as of the mid-1990s were failing to address the land use-related impacts to North Carolina's coastal resources because members of the localist advocacy coalitionincluding especially local officials charged with the CAMA planning task-did not particularly want them to do so. This appeared to be partly the result of a general priority on economic development to safeguard local revenues and growth. But it was mostly a function of localists' fierce and abiding resistance to any infringement by the state into local government prerogatives over land use policy making. Indeed, several officials from the most environmentally oriented localities appeared willing to jettison CAMA entirely (including the planning funds they received from the program) for the sake of preventing the state from imposing more stringent planning requirements on coastal localities.
Some of this resistance may have reflected parochialism on the part of local officials, and there may have been some political co-option by development interests, although I saw no evidence that either was a predominant factor. Rather, the compelling force behind this resistance was a sincere and profoundly held belief by localists in the benefits and prerogatives of local government.
6 Not only was this sense of localism profound, it was pervasive. It shaped CAMA's legal mandate from the start and it shaped the way the act had been implemented over time. 7 It also greatly concerned at least some state officials who feared that pushing localities too hard on local CAMA planning would yield a backlash in the state legislature 166 Norton Table 4 . Defining characteristics and points of conflict between localist and environmentalist advocacy coalitions.
Localist Coalition Environmentalist Coalition
Fundamental policy concerns
Safeguarding the autonomy of local governments to address local concerns with a minimum of state mandates or oversight.
Ensuring adequate protection and enhancement of the coastal resource base.
Policy beliefs regarding the appropriate purpose of local Coastal Area Management Act (CAMA) planning
Local planning per se Local environmental planning CAMA planning is a local function to be used primarily to advance local land use goals, focusing generally on ensuring orderly economic development and minimizing land use compatibility problems.
CAMA planning should be used to "direct appropriate growth to appropriate places," focusing primarily on the protection of coastal water quality and other coastal natural resources.
Localities need to address coastal resource protection through their plans only as required by state policy and law (i.e., need only comply with the state's area of environmental concern [AEC] permitting program and other state environmental regulatory programs). Localities can do more through their plans inside or outside designated AECs but cannot be compelled to do so.
Localities must address coastal resource protection through their plans by complying with the state's AEC and other regulatory programs and through efforts undertaken by the localities themselves (including local regulatory efforts for areas outside of AECs), to the extent necessary to ensure the adequate protection of those resources.
Appropriate local government responsibilities
Local officials are responsible primarily to their constituents; local policy decisions should reflect local goals. Citizens should work through the local planning process, and the state should defer to adopted local plans.
Local officials have a duty to address regional environmental impacts resulting from local policy decisions. Citizens should be able to take their concerns to the state when the locality fails to fulfill this obligation.
Causal assumptions
Coastal environmental problems cannot be clearly linked to local land use, and there is no real need to go beyond existing AEC rules. Upstream sources (especially agriculture outside of the CAMA region) are as large or a larger source of the problem.
Local land use policy decisions and land development are a primary source of the coastal regions' continuing resource decline, particularly with regard to impervious surfaces, loss of wetlands, septic problems, and shorefront development.
Principal concern regarding the future of local CAMA planning
The state should not impose additional unfunded state-level policy mandates down on local governments through more stringent planning requirements. "If it is important to the state, the state should regulate it directly."
The state should not continue to defer to local autonomy under the facade of a collaborative CAMA program because that approach is allowing coastal resources to decline while giving localities a false pretense of having done enough.
Principal criticism (by opposing coalition)
Coalition members (primarily local officials) have been co-opted by, or are themselves, local developers.
Coalition members want to close the door behind them and are cloaking their "NIMBYism" in a mantle of environmental protection.
and the evisceration of CAMA altogether. One state official noted, "Environmentalists just don't understand how local state government in North Carolina really is." Over the course of two and a half decades, CAMA appears to have succeeded in fostering a great deal of commitment by local elected officials to local planning, a real accomplishment given that local officials were among the most vocal opponents to CAMA's enactment. At the same time, CAMA has not succeeded all that well in fostering a strong sense of local commitment to the state's development management goals for the coastal region, especially commitment to addressing coastal resource protection through local planning efforts. That lack of commitment, and the resulting lack of attention to coastal resource protection through local plan making and implementation, goes a long way toward explaining why the CAMA planning program has not succeeded in arresting the decline of coastal resources from ongoing land development as its proponents had hoped it would.
It also helps to illuminate some of the more puzzling findings from my analysis of variation in planning efforts and outcomes across the coastal region. I was somewhat surprised to find that local elected officials' collective sense of the purpose of planning, the proper role of government, or proper balance between community and private property had no apparent influence on their commitment to planning. But taken altogether, local CAMA plans of record during the mid-1990s read more like vision statements than compelling policy arguments. They did not provide strong analytical justifications for their policies, and beyond the state-regulated AECs their policies were more exhortative than prescriptive. They were also very focused on a local sense of community interest-such as addressing neighboring land use compatibility concernsrather than a more regional "community interest" incorporating coastal resource protection. In sum, ideological characteristics apparently had no significant effect in terms of explaining variation in planning efforts and outcomes because local CAMA planning in practice did not really implicate them. Commenting on the lack of controversy surrounding his community's plan, particularly in terms of threatening private property rights, one local administrator noted, "You have to understand, this plan doesn't step on toes."
Similarly, recognizing the larger context of local CAMA planning in practice helps illuminate findings regarding the effects of political activism on different aspects of the CAMA planning program. These findings suggest that while citizen activism was important, different groups perhaps viewed the purpose of local planning in different ways or focused their efforts on points of access throughout the planning process most readily available to them. For example, the presence of vocal economic development activists in a community perhaps strengthened elected officials' predisposition to focus on economic development and to use planning to manage or accommodate that development more effectively, thus enhancing officials' commitment to planning. Environmental activists did not appear to have as ready access to local officials, in contrast, and their efforts to promote planning as a way to address environmental issues was seen more as a threat to local government autonomy. Their ability to affect local official's commitment to planning and use of the plan for decision making was thus limited. They did have ready access to the public plan-making process, however, and so were perhaps better able to prompt localities to produce stronger CAMA plans through that process.
Finally, approaching local CAMA plans as comprehensive policy arguments, I hypothesized that higher-quality plans in and of themselves would tend to increase local officials' use of the plan for land use-related decision making by virtue of providing more compelling analyses and better justified policies. This appears to have not been the case in coastal North Carolina. I suspect that the more vision-oriented and exhortative character of local CAMA plans taken altogetherresulting from and compounded by local officials' strong resistance to implementing state policy mandates through local plans-overwhelmed any influence that variation in plan quality was having on plan use. Or it could be that this finding was more an artifact of the ways in which I operationalized variables and framed the conceptual model for explaining variation in outcomes. Or it could be that variation in plan quality was indeed having no significant effect. This question in particular warrants additional study.
᭤ Conclusions and Questions for Further Study
In conclusion, the findings from this study of state-mandated local planning in coastal North Carolina complement the work coming out of the development management literature by confirming the importance of local commitment for explaining planning outcomes, while helping to refine that concept in terms of whose commitment is important, how it operates, and what motivations underlie it. These findings also complement work employing an advocacy coalition framework by highlighting the importance of and interactions between fundamental debates over substantive policy goals and the issue of land use governance. Taken altogether, they point especially to the importance of recognizing and distinguishing between these simultaneous debates over substantive policy and governance to better understand how different factors-like different configurations of state mandates-influence local planning efforts and outcomes. In North Carolina, the roles played by local commitment to planning and plan quality have both been important, but local commitment to substantive development management goals in light of local governance concerns has been especially important.
The findings from this research also suggest possible avenues for enhancing local planning efforts to advance regional growth management concerns while reconciling concerns about local autonomy. I found limited evidence that local officials were responding in lockstep with what they perceived to be constituent demands (up to the point of threatening their own reelection chances) but some evidence they were committed to planning both as a way to serve community interests and out of a sense of duty. As I completed my data collection and analysis for this study, I also saw several draft plan updates that appeared to be more focused on resource protection (plans not evaluated for this study) and observed several coastal communities where environmentalists appeared to be succeeding at the ballot box in electing more environmentally oriented local officials. The planning debates in coastal North Carolina reflect profound and long-established expectations-especially on the part of local officials-about what makes for a high quality of life and where the proper locus of land use governance should be. Recognizing the long-term shift in thinking that CAMA had effected by the mid-1990s, along with these more recent developments, suggests that political activism from below may be as important as state mandates from above in reshaping planning efforts and outcomes over time. Similarly, the apparent importance of litigation concerns in terms of enhancing local elected officials' commitment to planning suggests the importance of looking more closely at the relationships between plan quality, consistency between plans and regulations, and local commitment, something I was not able to do for this research.
All of these conclusions should be carefully qualified. The findings presented here constitute a plausible explanation of local planning efforts and outcomes for a given state employing a given planning mandate at a given point in time. As detailed above, the analytical limitations posed by the small sample size in particular meant that I was unable to conduct fully specified path regressions or other more sophisticated statistical analyses. More work is needed to test both the conceptual models presented here and the operational constructs used to measure key variables. More broadly, additional analysis of local planning efforts and outcomes in states employing different planning mandates would help clarify to what extent the findings presented here can be generalized. Finally, while this work represents an effort to more clearly link local commitment and plan quality to the actual use of plans by local officials when making decisions, more work is needed to link plan use to actual development management program outcomes and, ultimately, development and land use outcomes on the ground.
᭤ Appendix
Operational constructs for dependent variables.
Local Elected Officials' Commitment to Planning
Administrator response to the following question (telephone survey):
In a general sense, to what extent do you think the majority of your local elected board members were committed [during the study period] to the idea that land use planning is an appropriate and desirable function of local government? Specifically, how would you characterize their commitment to land use planning generally on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 indicates no commitment whatsoever to planning, 10 indicates a strong level of commitment, and 5 indicates a moderate level of commitment?
Overall Local Coastal Area Management Act (CAMA) Plan Quality
Scale constructed from the summation of plan content evaluation scores for nine plan attributes. The first eight plan attributes, each scored 1 (low) to 4 (high), included data analysis; statements of values and goals, land suitability/carrying capacity analysis, environmental protection policy statements, economic and community development policy statements, implementation assessment (i.e., of past plan efforts), monitoring and evaluation provisions, and the clarity of the link between the plan's land suitability analysis and its policies and future land use classifications. In addition, comprehensiveness of coverage was scored 0 (low) to 5 (high) based on the extent to which the plan addressed the topics specified by the state's land use planning guidelines.
Local CAMA Plan Use
Scale constructed from responses to the following question (telephone survey and mail surveys):
To what extent did the CAMA land use plan play a role in guiding the board's decision making on average or as a general rule (during the study period)? Specifically, please try to take into account all of the ways the plan might have played into the board's thinking, such as through their use of staff analyses or as a part of their public debate, and tell me how much of a role the plan played in the process using a scale of 0 to 10, with 0 meaning the plan played no role at all in the decision making, 10 indicating that the plan played the predominant role in the board's decision making, and 5 indicating that the plan was important but not the driving factor.
This question was asked for each of three purposes for which the plan may have been used by the locality, including the enactment or substantial revision of land userelated ordinances (e.g., zoning), site-specific land use-related decision making (e.g., rezonings), and/or infrastructure or capital improvement program decision making. These same questions were asked of local attorneys through a mail survey. Given a moderately strong correlation between administrator and attorney responses with regard to elected officials' use of the plan for enacting ordinances (coefficient = .5459, p-value = .0664), and based on the assumption that local managers were in the best position to evaluate elected officials' use of the plan, the following protocol was used to construct the measure of "plan use":
· If the administrator reported that the locality had enacted an ordinance (twenty-two cases), then the level of plan use for that activity as reported by the administrator was used to measure "plan use."
· If the administrator reported that the locality had not enacted an ordinance but had engaged in site-specific decision making (eleven cases), then the level of use for that purpose as reported by the administrator was used to measure "plan use."
· If the administrator reported that the locality had neither enacted an ordinance nor engaged in site-specific decision making, but that it had made infrastructure-related decisions (three cases), then the level of use for that purpose as reported by the administrator was used to measure "plan use."
Author's Note: Funding for this research was provided in part by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and by the Lincoln Institute of Land
Policy.
᭤ Notes
1. The North Carolina Division of Coastal Management provides a short history of the controversy and events leading to the land use planning moratorium and the formation of the stakeholder group on its Web site at http://dcm2.enr.state.nc.us/Planning/history.htm.
2. The twenty-county coastal region is divided administratively into four districts, running north to south. During the study period, each district had its own state district planner assigned to it.
The district planners were responsible for helping localities within their district prepare plan updates and for reviewing those plans for consistency with the state's administrative rules. Recognizing the potential for inconsistent program administration efforts across districts, I interviewed the state planners as well as local officials and citizens to see if I could find evidence of systematic differences in practice. I determined that while the planners had their own opinions about the Coastal Area Management Act (CAMA) planning program, they nonetheless met regularly to consult with one another and coordinate their administrative activities. I also conducted a series of t-tests on the differences between means for selected demographic characteristics across the four districts (sixteen measures ranging from per capita income to CAMA planning grant funding levels). I found no evidence of systematic differences across the four regions related to CAMA program administration.
3. Although somewhat unconventional, use of the social psychology literature on personal relationships to help explain program implementation phenomena is not without precedent. See, for example, Lyons, Lowery, and DeHoog's (1992) use of a wellestablished model on commitment to personal relationships to help explain variation in local government efforts to provide selected municipal services.
4. I approached county and town administrators first expecting that they would provide the most disinterested assessment of their elected officials' commitment to and use of the local CAMA plan. Planning directors were interviewed for eight localities either at the request of the administrator or because the administrator in office during the study period had since moved on and could not be located. I attempted to assess all sixty localities with populations greater than two thousand year-round or seasonal residents that participate in the CAMA planning program. I could not locate local officials in office during the study period for thirteen localities, however, while five administrators either declined to be interviewed or terminated the interview early. Finally, of the forty-two remaining localities, six were dropped because they had not used their CAMA plans at all during the study period for lack of development activity. Based on multiple comparisons across means for selected factors as between the thirty-six study localities and the twenty-four dropped localities, there appeared to be no systematic differences between the two groups. The telephone and mail survey instruments are available from the author upon request.
5. I evaluated plans for all thirty-six localities for which I was able to successfully complete a telephone survey, the three pretest localities, and an additional locality for which I terminated the telephone survey early, yielding a sample size of forty plans evaluated. The plan content evaluation instrument is available from the author upon request.
6. My sense was that localists' motivations were for the most part sincere rather than driven by political gain or parochialism. I neither saw nor heard any direct evidence of outright corruption. At the same time, I also believe that the environmentalists were for the most part sincere in their beliefs as well, motivated by a real concern for the coastal environment rather than a desire to instigate trouble or make political power grabs. The phenomenon of opponents on either side of a debate labeling one another and misattributing their underlying motivations as a way to discredit their arguments is worth more systematic study than I was able to conduct here. 7. A parallel and pervasive "localism" has been described by Briffault (1990) in a legal context through his analysis of judicial review of local land use regulations.
